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Abstract 
We investigated the role of moral disengagement in a legally-relevant judgment in this 
theoretically-driven empirical analysis.  Moral disengagement is social-cognitive phenomenon 
through which people reason their way toward harming others, presenting a useful framework for 
investigating legal judgments which often result in harming individuals for the good of society.  
We tested the role of moral disengagement in forensic psychologists’ willingness to conduct the 
most ethically questionable clinical task in the criminal justice system: competence for execution 
evaluations.  Our hypothesis that moral disengagement would function as mediator of 
participants’ existing attitudes and their judgments– a theoretical “bridge” between attitudes and 
judgments – was robustly supported.  Moral disengagement was key to understanding how 
psychologists decide to engage in competence for execution evaluations.  We describe in detail 
the moral disengagement measure we used, including exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses across two separate samples. The four-factor measure accounted for a total of 52.18% 
of the variance in the sample of forensic psychologists, and the model adequately fit the data in 
the entirely different sample of jurors in a confirmatory factor analysis. Despite the psychometric 
strengths of this moral disengagement measure, we describe the pros and cons of existing 
measures of moral disengagement.  We outline future directions for moral disengagement 
research, especially in legal contexts 
Keywords: moral disengagement; judgment; decision; forensic; competen*;  
capital punishment; psycholog* 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Moral disengagement (Bandura, 1986, 1999, 2015) is a social-cognitive framework for 
understanding an individual’s decision to act in a potentially harmful manner toward other(s). 
Grounded in a broader social-cognitive understanding of the self, Bandura argues that the 
cognitive disengagement of moral agency by an individual can allow one to act in ways they 
otherwise might not.  It occurs via several interrelated cognitive mechanisms through which 
people can deactivate moral self-regulatory processes and disengage from feelings of moral 
“wrongness” to arrive at a decision to engage in behaviors that might otherwise feel “wrong.”  
Humans are remarkably adept at reasoning their way toward desired conclusions, constructing 
justifications through cognitive processes designed in ways to help them do so (Kunda, 1990).  
Moral disengagement is one such cognitive process or pathway through which motivated 
reasoning may yield a desired conclusion. 
Occupational roles in the legal system often involve decisions that may result in inflicting 
harm on others.  A definition of harm we proffer for the study of moral disengagement in the 
legal system is any behavior which may, either directly or indirectly, cause physical or 
psychological injury, death, or deprivation of liberty to another person.  For example, police 
officers must make decisions about arresting people and taking them into custody, thereby 
depriving them of liberty; prosecuting attorneys must use their discretion to decide whether or 
not to file charges and whether to seek more severe punishments; and forensic scientists and 
forensic mental health professionals must interpret evidence and communicate professional 
decisions relevant to the case, such as whether a particular pair of fingerprints “matched” the 
defendant or whether or the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime, decisions that 
contribute to triers’ verdict and sentencing decisions.  Furthermore, judges and jurors must make 
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decisions that may deprive people of liberty, place people in prison environments where they 
may be physically or psychologically injured, or impose the death penalty to end someone’s life, 
among other decisions.  Each of these decisions may lead to harm to the suspect or defendant.  
Of course, there may be compelling reasons to reach these judgments (and in fact there usually 
are – which is the primary reason we have a legal system in the first place), which underscores 
the utility of moral disengagement for understanding the process.  
Various parties in the justice process hold occupational roles that require them to make 
decisions and engage in behaviors that will harm others.  They may experience a variety of 
feelings, personal beliefs, moral objections, or attitudes related to the potential consequences of 
their decisions.  As a result of these conflicts, people may selectively disengage from personal 
moral self-sanctions so they can perform their occupational or societal duties while 
simultaneously maintaining their emotional well-being (Neal & Brodsky, 2016; Osofsky, 
Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005). For people who work in the legal system, who are often in 
situations in which their decisions may result in substantial potentially negative outcomes for 
suspects, defendants, and offenders, moral disengagement may serve a function to assuage guilty 
feelings related to potential outcomes of their societally-accepted involvement in the legal 
process that may lead to harm. 
Despite a robust moral disengagement literature, few studies have applied this theory to 
the context of the legal system.  We conduct a novel test of moral disengagement theory by 
examining its role in a new legally-relevant judgment context, as a mediator between decision 
makers’ attitudes and their legally-relevant judgments.  Specifically, moral disengagement is 
examined as a mediator of forensic psychologists’ death penalty attitudes and their willingness to 
participate in Competence for Execution evaluations.  The associations between these variables 
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have been documented, and this project focuses specifically on how those associations occur – 
the mechanism through which these variables may be related to one another.  We hypothesize 
that moral disengagement is such a mediator that might explain how these attitudes and 
outcomes are related, given that moral disengagement can account for how people decide to do 
harm to others – especially in contexts when the harm may be justifiable (like this legal 
situation). 
We have grappled with two tensions in moral disengagement theory relevant to its 
application in the legal system.  First, Sternberg (2016) noted that sometimes some harm must be 
done for greater good.  This reflects a tension that ethics scholars have written about in the legal 
system – that competing moral and ethical foundations exist in the legal system and thus that 
multiple perspectives are defensible and must be weighed against one another (e.g., individual 
rights vs. societal rights; Candilis & Neal, 2014).  Second, Bandura (2015) noted that a person’s 
subjective moral framework is what ultimately matters for moral disengagement.  That is, people 
have different views regarding what constitutes moral behavior, and moral disengagement is a 
subjective process in which people disengage from these subjectively-held values.  These issues 
have the potential to complicate measurement and hypothesis tests. 
We have done a few things to try to address these issues.  First, to identify potential 
situations in which people might morally disengage in the legal system, we relied on the 
definition of harm provided earlier in this paper as a guide rather than on our own subjective 
values about what would be morally wrong or right.  Second, we selected an issue about which 
we knew people would vary regarding what constitutes moral behavior (i.e., conducting 
competence for execution evaluations; e.g., Bonnie, 1990). And third, we measured moral values 
and included the full range of these values in our model for a robust test of our hypothesis.   
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A. Moral Disengagement Theory 
The disengagement of moral agency is not a simple process. Moral disengagement theory 
assumes people self-regulate via a complicated set of cognitive hurdles (Bandura, 1999).  
Bandura and his colleagues (e.g., Bandura, 1986, 1999, 2015; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & 
Pastorelli, 1996; Bandura, Caprara, Barbarenelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; Osofsky et al., 
2005) articulated the sequence of events that typically occur in order for an act to be perceived as 
morally justifiable by an individual.  The sequence of events involves the actor of the potential 
act: (a) considering committing an act with the potential to harm a specified target, (b) evaluating 
the consequences of the action, and (c) judging whether the target is warranting of the act.  
Cognitive mechanisms by which justification is reached come from four sources: justifying the 
nature of the act itself (i.e., moral justification, palliative comparison, euphemistic labeling), 
minimizing the actors’ role in committing the transgression (i.e., displacement and diffusion of 
responsibility), viewing the consequences as minimal (i.e., minimizing, ignoring, or 
misconstruing the consequences of the act), and by blaming the target as deserving of harm (i.e., 
dehumanization, attribution of blame; Bandura, 1999).  
One study, conducted by Osofsky and colleagues (2005), examined the nature of moral 
disengagement among personnel at varying levels of the execution process: actual executioners, 
emotional support team members, and prison guards uninvolved in the process (presumably as a 
comparison group).  As expected, Osofsky et al. reported that those legal personnel most closely 
associated to the harmful act (i.e., carrying out the death penalty) exhibited the greatest levels of 
moral disengagement. Of note, support team members, a group originally endorsing lower levels 
of moral disengagement, demonstrated increased moral disengagement as they participated in, or 
were habituated to, more executions.  Osofsky and colleagues’ (2005) findings show the 
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relevance of moral disengagement for people who work within the legal system. The impact of 
one’s cognitive justification for decisions that may lead to harm, even for convicted offenders 
perceived as worthy of such punishment, warrants further attention.  
B. Legal Context Our Study: Competence for Execution (CFE) 
 In the landmark case Ford v. Wainwright (1986), the United States Supreme Court held 
that capital punishment constituted cruel and unusual punishment for insane individuals in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Competency for execution requires that the defendant have 
both a factual and rational understanding of the reasons for the execution (Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 2007).  To make these competency determinations, the legal system often asks 
mental health professionals to provide relevant information by conducting forensic mental health 
evaluations of these individuals.  
1. Mental Health Professional Involvement in CFE Evaluations. 
There has been a lively debate in the mental health fields about the ethicality of 
participating in CFE evaluations.  On one side of the debate are scholars asserting that mental 
health professionals should not be involved in these proceedings due to the ethical prohibition 
against harming clients and patients (e.g., Ewing, 1987; Radelet & Barnard, 1986). On the other 
side of the debate are scholars asserting that CFE evaluations are not substantively different than 
any other kind of forensic evaluation in which there is potential that harm would occur to the 
evaluee (e.g., Bonnie, 1990; Mossman, 1987).   
Regardless of one’s position, data show that psychologists report less willingness to 
participate in CFE evaluations than other kinds of forensic evaluations (Pirelli & Zapf, 2008). 
Some data suggest clinicians may choose to be involved early in a capital case, but refrain as the 
possibility of an execution draws closer (Brodsky, Zapf, & Boccaccini, 2005).  Pirelli and Zapf 
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reported that roughly 35% of mental health professionals said they would refuse to participate in 
competence for execution evaluations even though they would conduct other capital evaluations.  
Might the clinicians’ attitudes toward capital punishment have anything to do with their 
willingness to participate in CFE evaluations?  Indeed, studies have suggested that stronger 
capital punishment support is associated with greater willingness to conduct CFE evaluations 
(Deitchman, Kennedy, & Beckham, 1991; Pirelli & Zapf, 2008).  But these studies do not shed 
light on the reasons for that relationship; various mechanisms could explain it.   
Perhaps clinicians with higher death penalty support are more willing to become involved 
because clinicians who do not believe in capital punishment abstain, thus leading to a biased 
representation of clinician support toward capital punishment among those willing to take CFE 
cases.  This explanation would parallel Haney’s (2005) observation that death-qualified juries are 
biased toward death given the overrepresentation of death penalty-supportive jurors on death 
qualified juries.  However, these studies also show that some mental health professionals with 
low support for capital punishment may nevertheless be willing to conduct CFE evaluations 
(e.g., Pirelli & Zapf, 2008), which suggests that attitude toward capital punishment is not the 
only mechanism underlying clinicians’ decisions to become involved in CFE cases.  The current 
study zeroes in on another potential explanation: moral disengagement.  The disengagement of 
moral agency might explain how mental health professionals – accounting for their position on 
the issue of capital punishment – become involved in cases in which they may end up facilitating 
the termination of the individual’s life. 
C. Hypothesized Model 
We expect that moral disengagement will mediate the relation between forensic 
psychologists’ death penalty attitudes and their self-reported willingness to accept Competence 
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for Execution referrals (see Figure 1).  We also set out to evaluate the structure of the Moral 
Disengagement Scale (MDS; Osofsky et al., 2005) among legal decision-makers who must 
recommend varying levels of punishment in independent samples by conducting an Exploratory 
Factor Analysis with our forensic psychologists and a Confirmatory Factor Analysis in an 
independent sample of actual jurors.   
  
 
II. METHOD 2 
A. Participants 
The participant sample for this study consisted of practicing forensic psychologists in 
North America.  To generate potential participants, the American Psychological Association 
(APA) website directory was used.  Previous research with both APA members and those who 
are not APA members indicate APA membership is representative of doctoral-level clinicians 
with respect to demographic characteristics, education, and employment (Center for Mental 
Health Services, 1996; Howard et al., 1986; Stapp, Tucker, & VandenBos, 1985).  Stapp, 
                                                          
2 Portions of the same dataset used in this study were used in other papers (Neal & Brodsky, 2014, 2016; Neal, 
2016).  However, the variables of interest in each study are unique.  The variables of focus in this paper (mediator 
and dependent variable) were not used or reported in the previous papers.   
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Tucker, and VandenBos concluded that the APA membership database is sufficiently 
representative of licensed clinicians to use the member database for policy research.  A sample of 
962 participants with clinical-forensic interests was identified through the APA directory.  
Surveys were mailed to all of these people.   
Of the 962 surveys mailed, 351 were completed for a completion rate of 41.54%.3 The 
full sample was composed of forensic psychologists in 43 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, and British Columbia and Ontario, Canada.  The age 
range was 28 to 86 years, with a mean of 59.25 (SD= 9.45).  Most of the participants in this 
sample were Caucasian (90.6%); other reported ethnicities were 4.9% Hispanic, 1.1% African-
American, 0.9% Asian, and 2.6% Other.  Approximately two-thirds of the respondents were men 
(69.5%; 30.5% female). Participants in this sample evidenced a number of years of experience, 
with a mean of 22.35 years conducting forensic evaluations (SD = 9.68).  Almost thirty percent 
(28.4%) reported being certified by a specialty board.  
B. Procedure 
The mailed packet included a cover letter indicating the research was being conducted by 
a university student, an Institutional Review Board participant information sheet, the 
questionnaire printed on green paper, and a separate trifolded debriefing page with “Please open 
only AFTER survey is complete” visible until unfolded.  Also enclosed were a self-addressed 
stamped envelope with first-class postage and a one-dollar bill as gesture of appreciation.  A 
                                                          
3 One hundred and seventy-seven surveys were returned as undeliverable, thus 785 were presumably received.  The 
completion rate was calculated as 351 returned out of 785.  Of note, Neal (2016) used a subsample of this group of 
respondents – only those who practice in states with the death penalty (n = 206 of these 351 for that paper).  We 
considered restricting the current analysis to that same subsample of 206, but decided to present the data for the full 
sample in this paper because we were interested in their willingness to consider CFE work irrespective of 
jurisdiction.  We performed the same analyses described below on this subsample of 206 and a similar pattern of 
results were obtained.   
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follow-up postcard was sent two weeks later.  These methods (e.g., university sponsorship, green 
paper, first-class postage, dollar bill, and postcard) were chosen because each have been shown 
to increase postal survey response rates (Fox, Crask, & Kim, 1988; King & Vaughan, 2004). 
C. Materials 
1. Demographics and Dependent Variable 
A questionnaire developed for this study included personal and professional demographic 
questions.  It also asked “Have you or would you conduct a competency for execution 
evaluation?” which served as our dependent variable in this analysis. 
2. Death Penalty Attitudes Scale (DPAS). 
O’Neil, Patry, and Penrod (2004) constructed the 15-item DPAS to measure jurors’ 
attitudes toward the death penalty.  Items are answered on a nine-point Likert-type scale (1, 
strongly disagree, to 9, strongly agree) with higher scores indicating greater death penalty 
support. Although the scale was initially designed to measure jurors’ death penalty attitudes, the 
scale has been found to correlate highly (r > 0.85) with other measures of death penalty support 
and has demonstrated strong psychometric properties in previous research. Results were used to 
obtain quantitative data regarding the relative strength of the participants’ attitudes toward the 
death penalty.  The DPAS evidenced good reliability in this sample; α = 0.84, average inter-item 
correlation = 0.27.   
3. Moral Disengagement Scale (MDS) 
Participants completed the MDS (Osofsky et al., 2005), a 19-item self-report inventory 
with items anchored on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).4  
                                                          
4 The actual scale uses the reverse anchors, which we used in data collection (i.e., 1 was strongly agree and 5 was 
strongly disagree).  However, the data is easier to interpret when recoded, so for the purposes of these analyses, we 
reversed the scale so that higher scores corresponded with higher moral disengagement. 
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Although moral disengagement theory is not specific to the death penalty context, this particular 
scale was developed in the context of measuring the various forms of disengagement from moral 
self-sanctions regarding executions.  This is because Osofsky et al. examined the cognitive 
processes involved in executioners and support staff prior to an execution.  Because the current 
study is also in the capital punishment context, we chose to use this measure.  The items on this 
scale assess eight mechanisms Osofsky and colleagues (2005) outlined thorough which moral 
self-sanctions are disengaged from involvement in the lethal death penalty process.  The MDS 
evidenced good reliability in this sample; α = 0.86, average inter-item correlation = 0.25.   
Although the authors of the scale published data examining its validity and reliability in 
various contexts (see e.g., Osofsky et al, 2005), the individual items had not been published prior 
to our analysis.  We contacted the authors and obtained permission to use the scale and a copy of 
the individual items from Drs. Osofsky and Zimbardo (personal communications, Feb 27 2009).   
We had hoped to confirm the factor structure previously summarized in Osofsky et al.’s (2005) 
original report.  Unfortunately, however, we were unable to obtain details about which items 
loaded on which factors in the Osofsky et al.’s (2005) report.  Thus, we opted to conduct an 
exploratory factor analysis in this sample and to attempt to confirm it in a separate sample to 
establish the psychometric validity of the scale prior to conducting our a priori analyses for this 
project.  Dr. Zimbardo expressed permission on behalf of himself and his colleagues for us to 
publish their MDS items in this report (personal communication, August 19, 2012). 
a. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) of the Moral Disengagement Scale. 
We conducted an EFA in this sample of forensic psychologists to explore the underlying 
internal structure of the measure.  First, we conducted an EFA on the 19-item MDS with 
principal component analysis as the extraction method in SPSS.  Four factors had eigenvalues 
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greater than one; thus we rotated data with an orthogonal Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
method set to four factors.  Table 15 shows the items that loaded at values greater than 0.4 on the 
four factors.  Nine items loaded on the first factor, “Rationalization,” which accounted for 
18.18% of the variance after rotation (eigenvalue = 3.46 after rotation).  The second factor, 
“Security and Economic Justifications,” accounted for 15.39% of the variance after rotation and 
had six items loading on it (eigenvalue = 2.93).  The third factor was “Dehumanization” (10.77% 
of the variance, eigenvalue = 2.05), and the fourth factor was “Non-Responsibility” (7.84% of 
the variance, eigenvalue = 1.49).  These four factors overlap conceptually with those reported by 
Osofsky et al. (2005) and we used their language to label these factors where we could do so.  
Please refer to Table 2 for scaled descriptive statistics regarding the MDS factors and total 
scores. 
 
 
  
                                                          
5 Note that the EFA values in the table are from the forensic psychologist sample, and the CFA values are from a 
separate sample of jurors.   
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Table 1.  Factor Loadings for MDS Items from the EFA (forensic psychologists) and the CFA (separate juror sample). 
  
 
     EFA              CFA (Standardized) 
   S.E 
Factor 1: Rationalization 
#1   (Murderers should be executed to deter others from committing murder) 0.43 0.05 0.11 
#6   (Capital punishment is not as bad as the murders that convicts have committed) 0.74 0.61‡ 0.11 
#8   (Capital punishment is just a legal penalty for murder) 0.50 0.52‡ 0.06 
#9   (An execution is merciful compared to a murder) 0.62 0.70‡ 0.04 
#11 (When the 12 jurors approve the death penalty, no 1 juror should be held responsible for the decision to execute a murderer) 0.51 0.39‡ 0.10 
#12 (Those who carry out state executions should not be criticized for following society’s wishes) 0.69 0.51‡ 0.07 
#14 (Nowadays the death penalty is done in ways that minimize the suffering of the person being executed)  0.71 0.66‡ 0.05 
#15 (Elaborate legal safeguards assure that innocent persons are not executed) 0.42 0.46‡ 0.06 
#19 (Murderers should blame themselves when they receive the death penalty) 0.58 0.64‡ 0.05 
Factor 2: Security and Economic Justifications 
#1 (Murderers should be executed to deter others from committing murder) 0.62 0.81‡ 0.10 
#2 (If a society is to be law-abiding, murders must be avenged with capital punishment) 0.65 0.83‡ 0.04 
#3 (The bible teaches that murders must be avenged: “life for a life and eye for eye”) 0.43 0.63‡ 0.04 
#4 (Life imprisonment for murderers is unacceptable, b/c prison guards will be endangered by convicts who have nothing to lose) 0.74 0.70‡ 0.05 
#5 (Life imprisonment for murderers is unacceptable, because they can escape to kill again) 0.79 0.65‡ 0.05 
#7 (The death penalty is right because it costs society less than keeping murderers in prison for life) 0.50 0.68‡ 0.05 
Factor 3: Dehumanization 
#10 (Jurors do not have much say about the death penalty because later court rulings will decide the matter) 0.41 0.14 0.08 
#16 (Murderers who receive the death penalty have forfeited the right to be considered full human beings) 0.75 0.73‡ 0.05 
#17 (Because of the nature of their crimes, murderers have lost important human qualities) 0.79 0.87‡ 0.05 
#18 (Society has no choice but to impose the death penalty for horrible crimes) 0.51 0.21 0.11 
Factor 4: Non-Responsibility 
#10 (Jurors do not have much say about the death penalty because later court rulings will decide the matter) 0.49 0.38‡ 0.10 
#11 (When the 12 jurors approve the death penalty, no 1 juror should be held responsible for the decision to execute a murderer) 0.56 0.17 0.11 
#13 (Jurors do not have much choice in their decisions about the death penalty because they have to follow sentencing instructions) 0.76 0.83‡ 0.15 
Note. CFA items significantly loading on factors at the ‡ p < 0.001 level  
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Table 2.  Means (and Standard Deviations) on the MDS Factors and Total Scale. 
 Factor 1 
Rationalization 
Factor 2 
Security & 
Economic 
Justifications 
Factor 3 
Dehumanization 
Factor 4 
Non-
Responsibility 
Total 
Score 
Forensic 
Psychologists 
 
2.88 (0.77) 1.74 (0.59) 1.75 (0.71) 2.74 (0.69) 2.32 (0.54) 
Actual Jurors 3.67 (0.76) 3.09 (1.01) 2.85 (1.85) 3.37 (0.81) 3.32 (0.75) 
Note: Higher MDS values indicate higher moral disengagement.  The values for the factors and total scores 
presented here are average values as rated on the 5-point response scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). 
 
b. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of the Moral Disengagement Scale. 
We tested the optimal four-factor structure that emerged from the EFA in the forensic 
psychologist sample by using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in a separate sample of actual 
jurors who also completed the same MDS scale (α = 0.91, average inter-item correlation = 0.33). 
These participants were 301 jury venire members from four county courthouses in the 
southwestern United States. The sample had mean age of 47.3 years (SD = 12.7) and was 55.5% 
female (43.5% male, 1.0% unspecified) and 77.7% White (8.6% African American, 5.0% 
Hispanic, 6.9% other, and 1.8% unspecified).  No other details about this separate sample are 
provided, because the data is solely relevant for examining the psychometric properties of the 
MDS scale as relevant for this paper. 
A total of three a priori CFA models were tested: a) a one-factor model indicated by all 
MDS items, b) a model in which items loaded on four factors with randomized items, and c) our 
proposed four-factor model from the EFA.  The purpose of comparing these three models was to 
explore whether our proposed four-factor model would better fit the data than the other two 
models.      
We conducted a CFA with maximum likelihood estimation in Mplus 5.21 (Muthen & 
Muthen, 2005).  We estimated parameters with robust scaling (i.e., MLR) and freed the 
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parameters but fixed latent variances to one so that the latent factor scores would have a 
standardized metric.  We evaluated model fit with the Satorra-Bentler scaling correction χ2 
statistic (Satorra & Bentler, 1994) as well as the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), Confirmatory Fit Index (CFI; 
Bentler, 1990), Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1987), and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978).   
We included these comparative fit indices because the χ2 statistic is easily influenced by 
sample size and is therefore an inappropriately strict test of model fit (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; 
Kline, 2010; Marsh, Hau, & Grayson, 2005).  Comparing the fit of various models is an 
acceptable method of evaluating model fit: smaller χ2, AIC, and BIC values correspond to better 
fitting models (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010).  RMSEA values up to 0.05 indicate good fit, 
between 0.06 and 0.08 indicate adequate fit, and > 0.10 indicate poor fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Kline, 2010). SRMR values below .08 are indicative of a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). CFI 
values greater than 0.90 generally indicative of acceptable model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
We estimated three separate models using the 19 MDS items.  Please refer to Table 3 for 
the model fit indices.6  The four-factor model that emerged in our EFA was a better fit for the 
data than the one-factor and random four-factor models.  The only model that adequately fit the 
data according to the RMSEA value was this optimized four-factor model.  Although each of the 
three models were acceptable according to the SRMR, the optimized four-factor model had the 
lowest (i.e., best) value and the AIC and BIC were lowest for this optimized four-factor model as 
well.  None of the models were an acceptable fit according to the CFI criteria, though the CFI 
                                                          
6 We used the random number generator at www.random.org to assign items randomly to four factors in the 
“random” model. 
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value for the optimized four-factor model was certainly the closest to the .90 cut-off with a value 
of .87.  It should be noted that the CFI statistic has been shown to be excessively low in models 
that use item-level data even when the models are accurately specified (see e.g., Marsh et al., 
2005).  We conclude based on the totality of the information that the optimized four-factor model 
is an adequate fit for the MDS data, Satorra-Bentler χ2 (143) = 351.40, CFI = 0.87, RMSEA = 
0.070 (90% CI = 0.061 – 0.079), SRMR = 0.06, AIC = 17,203.83, and BIC = 17,447.39. 
All but four items loaded significantly on their respective factors at p < 0.001 (see Table 
1). None of those four items loaded significantly on their respective factors.  Specifically, item 1 
about deterring future murders did not load on factor 1, though it did load on factor 2 where it 
theoretically fits better.  Item 10 about judges rather than jurors having control over sentences 
did not load on factor 3, but loaded on factor 4 where it fit better.  Items 11 and 18 did not load 
on any factor, which reflected that no single juror should be held responsible for a sentencing.  
 
Table 3.  Goodness-of-Fit Indices for Model testing the MDS Factor Structure in CFA. 
Model SB-X2 df CFI RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
SRMR AIC BIC 
Items 
One-factor 
 
 
540.56 152 0.76 0.093 
(0.085-0.101) 
0.07 17,411.16 
 
17,621.51 
 
Four factor (Random) 
 
 
540.71 146 0.75 0.096 
(0.087-0.104) 
0.07 17,413.02 17,645.52 
Four factor (Optimized) 351.40 143 0.87 0.070 
(0.061-0.079) 
0.06 17,203.83 17,447.39 
Note. SB-X2: Satorra–Bentler scaled chi-square; df: degrees of freedom; CFI: comparative fit index; RMSEA: root 
mean square error of approximation; SRMR: standardized root mean square residual; CI: confidence interval; AIC: 
Akaike’s information criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion. 
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III. RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Please refer to Table 4 for basic descriptive statistics, including the mean, standard 
deviation, and range for forensic psychologists’ scores on the death penalty attitudes scale and 
the moral disengagement scale as well as the frequencies and percentages of forensic 
psychologists responses to the “have or would you conduct a CFE evaluation” outcome variable. 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics. 
Death Penalty Attitudes Scale M (SD) = 3.16 (1.25) Range = 1 to 7 
Moral Disengagement Scale M (SD) = 2.32 (0.54) Range = 1 to 3.89 
Have or would you conduct a CFE evaluation? “No” n = 154 (43.9%) “Yes” n = 146 (41.6%) 
 
B. Hypothesized Mediation Analysis. 
We conducted a simple mediation analysis using ordinary least squares path analysis (for 
the a path) and maximum likelihood logistic regression path analysis (for the b, and c’ paths; 
Hayes, 2013) using Hayes’ PROCESS macro.  Consistent with our hypothesis, results indicated 
that death penalty support indirectly influenced willingness to accept a CFE referral through its 
effects on the cognitive disengagement of moral agency.   
As can be seen in Table 5 and Figure 2, participants with higher death penalty support 
engaged in greater moral disengagement than those with lower death penalty support (a = 5.982), 
and participants who engaged in greater moral disengagement were more likely to accept a CFE 
referral (b = 0.039).  A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = 
0.232) based on 10,000 bootstrap samples was entirely above zero (0.017 – 0.466), indicating 
that the indirect mediation path was significant. This indirect effect means that evaluators with 
higher support for the death penalty engage in more moral disengagement (because a is positive), 
which is turn is associated with into greater willingness to engage in CFE evaluations (because b 
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is positive). There was no evidence that attitudes directly influenced willingness to conduct CFE 
evaluations independent of its effect on moral disengagement (c’= 0.181, p = 0.219). 
Table 5.  Model Coefficients. 
 
 Mediator (MDS) Outcome  
(Willingness to accept CFE referral) 
 Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE          p 
Predictor (DPAS) 5.982 0.342 <0.001              0.181 0.147      0.219 
Mediator (MDS) ---  --- ---              0.039 0.018      0.035 
Constant 25.023 1.171 <0.001            -2.332 -3.867       0.001 
       
 R2 = 0.535 Nagelkerke R2 = 0.099 
 F(1, 266) = 306.466, p < 0.001 Normal theory tests not available  
for binary outcome models (Hayes, 2013) 
 
Note: DPAS = Death Penalty Attitude Scale. MDS = Moral Disengagement Scale.  CFE = Competence for 
Execution.  Coeff. = unstandardized regression coefficient.  SE = standard error.   
 
 
  
 
It is important to note direction and causation cannot be inferred in correlational 
mediation analysis.  We are careful to avoid causal language, but the theoretical directions we 
inferred in Figure 2 may not be the correct directions.  That is, perhaps a forensic psychologist 
who decides to engage in competence for execution evaluations then engages in a process of 
moral disengagement that leads them to revise their death penalty attitudes to be consistent with 
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their behaviors.  It is also worth noting that scholars of mediation analysis have adopted the 
perspective that mediation analyses are appropriate even in the absence of a direct association 
between independent and dependent variables, as is the case with this data (see e.g., Hayes, 
2013, pp. 87-88).  
VI: DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of moral disengagement in a legally-
related decision and to further establish moral disengagement as a construct worthy of study in 
the legal context.  In the present study, we did not focus on a particular mechanism of moral 
disengagement: rather, we were looking to establish a broader link between the theory of moral 
disengagement and legal judgments beyond the one legally-relevant context Osofsky et al. 
provided in 2005.  This aim was achieved.  The tenets of moral disengagement are compelling 
(see Bandura, 2015) and this theory lends itself to many different applications in the legal 
system, with this study and the Ososfky et al. study providing the initial link between the theory 
of moral disengement and legal judgments.  Future work is needed to understand the various 
specific mechanisms of moral disengagement in legal contexts.   
Our hypothesis that moral disengagement would play a critical role in legally-relevant 
judgments was robustly supported.  Specifically, we hypothesized that forensic psychologists’ 
death penalty attitudes would affect their willingness to take these CFE cases (a direct effect), 
but that the relationship would be fully mediated by moral disengagement.  Indeed, results 
indicated that the moral disengagement mechanism is key to understanding how forensic 
psychologists make these decisions.  But this mechanism was even stronger than we expected.  
We were surprised to discover that death penalty attitudes themselves had no direct association 
with willingness to accept CFE referrals (i.e., the direct effect was not significant).  But adding in 
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moral disengagement as a mechanism of this decision fully linked these variables in a mediation 
model.  The findings reveal that greater death penalty support among forensic psychologists was 
associated with increased disengagement of moral agency, which in turn was associated with 
increased likelihood of accepting CFE referrals.  This means that the more supportive 
psychologists are of the death penalty, the more likely they are to construct cognitive 
justifications for engaging in the CFE evaluator role – a finding that is consistent with theories of 
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) and motivated justice (e.g., Sood, 2013).  These findings 
lend strong support to the theory of moral disengagement and its application to the legal context. 
We used the Moral Disengagement Scale developed by Ososfsky, Bandura, and 
Zimbardo in their 2005 study of executioners.  This scale is internally consistent and its factor 
structure fits the theory it purports to measure. However, the way they designed the scale was 
heavily influenced by the context of the original study.  In fact, many of the items appear to 
measure capital punishment support, even though they were designed to measure various moral 
justifications for the execution process (such as minimizing consequences, displacement of 
responsibility, and dehumanization –all specific to the capital punishment context).  In other 
work in which Bandura and colleagues investigate moral disengagement processes, they 
designed different scales that fit those other contexts (e.g., justifying military force in McAlister, 
Bandura, & Owen, 2006, delinquent and aggressive child behavior in Bandura et al., 1996).   
Given that our study was in the context of capital punishment, and given that this 
particular measure of moral disengagement was designed to measure this construct in a capital 
punishment context, it is perhaps not surprising that results emerged.  Similar theoretically-
driven studies of moral disengagement as a mediator of legally-relevant judgments in contexts 
outside of capital punishment should perhaps use a context-independent (or a context-
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appropriate) measure of moral disengagement. It is worth noting, however, that some studies 
have successfully used a context-dependent moral disengagement scale in contexts other than the 
scale’s context (e.g., McDermott & Miller, 2016 used a moral disengagement scale for torture 
contexts in a vigilante justice study).  It is worth exploring when and why different measures of 
moral disengagement are useful in various contexts.  
Perhaps a context-independent, “pure” measure of moral disengagement could be 
developed as a standardized way of measuring moral disengagement across contexts.  Some posit 
that moral disengagement as a trait-like tendency (e.g., Pelton, Gound, Forehand, & Brody, 
2004), but no measure is yet available to measure moral disengagement across contexts.  At the 
very least, researchers need to be aware that whereas the theory of moral disengagement is 
widely applicable, the existing published measures of moral disengagement are heavily context-
dependent.   
Given these reflections, it appears more research is needed to explore moral 
disengagement as a context-specific phenomenon versus a dispositional trait-like tendency.  If it 
is the former, then context-specific measures of moral disengagement are likely to proliferate, as 
has occurred in domains in which debates about the domain-specific versus generalized nature of 
constructs have occurred (e.g., self-efficacy and institutional trust – see respectively Bandura, 
1997 and PytlikZillig et al., 2016).  If it is the latter, a good measure of moral disengagement 
applicable across various contexts is needed. 
This discussion of moral disengagement as a trait-like vs. more contextually-based 
concept is not necessarily consistent with Bandura’s theory.  Moral disengagement, as proposed 
by Bandura, is not a trait construct.  Rather, people disengage selectively from moral standards in 
specific contexts (Bandura, 1999, 2015).  Hence, the more situationally-specific the measure, the 
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stronger the relationship with behavior is likely to be.  The development of a context-
independent, trait-like measure of moral disengagement might require a different 
conceptualization of the moral disengagement process than that proposed by Bandura.  
Another direction for future research is to experimentally study the various mechanisms 
of moral disengagement in legal contexts, such as in mock juror studies. Can moral 
disengagement be experimentally induced and reduced?  For example, might manipulated 
euphemistic language from the prosecutor about the defendant increase moral disengagement 
compared to a control group? Might manipulated euphemistic language from the defense 
attorney about the victim decrease moral disengagement compared to control?  
There are several strengths of this paper, but of course there are limitations as well.  The 
primary strengths are that the research question was approached in a unique ways and with an 
ecologically valid sample: real forensic psychologists.  The legal context was ecologically valid 
as well: forensic clinicians actually have to decide whether to do competence for execution 
evaluations.  Although it is unfortunate that we don’t have access to data about the people who 
did not respond to the survey, we know that a 43% response rate is a reasonably high response 
rate for surveys like this and fits in the range that is typical for this kind of research (e.g., 
response rates among psychologist participants was 35% in Lally, 2003, 40% in Rabin, Barr, & 
Burton, 2005, and 42% in Boothby & Clements, 2000).  The limitations include limitations of 
the sample itself, and limitations associated with the measures and with our methods.   
With regard to the forensic psychologist sample, it was composed of older, White men – 
perhaps retirees with enough time to respond to a survey like the one we mailed.  With regard to 
limitations of our measures, each construct was measured with a single measure –with particular 
contextual assumptions as described previously.  Including additional measures of these 
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constructs might have clarified the extent to which the findings were related to the limitations of 
the single measures, as opposed to the theory.  And our question about willingness to conduct the 
evaluations simultaneously asked about past behavior and future willingness in a single question.  
Ideally, either past behavior or future willingness would have been the focus of the question.   
With regard to our methods, these data were correlational and thus causality cannot be 
inferred.  We were careful to appropriately restrict language about the correlational relationships.  
Nevertheless, these correlational data mean that the directionality of the pathways in the 
mediation model is not known.  For instance, our data cannot shed light on whether death penalty 
support results in increased moral disengagement or vice versa – a common issue with mediation 
in correlational designs. And furthermore, increased involvement in performing CFE evaluations 
could lead to more moral disengement.  Thus, future work designed to infer causality will be 
useful for studying moral disengagement in the legal system. 
In sum, we think moral disengagement is a useful framework that may yield a rich and 
interesting line of research on how the mechanisms proposed by Bandura operate in legal 
contexts.  This theory holds great promise for understanding how justice is decided, meted out, 
and perceived.  Future research is needed to understand the antecedents and consequences of 
moral disengagement in and to what degree it is a “state” versus a “trait.”  Is moral 
disengagement a learned “skill?” If moral disengagement can be measured across contexts, a 
context-independent tool for measuring it is needed.  We look forward to future discoveries of 
these and many other answers related to moral disengagement in the legal system.   
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